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Covid-19 is neither the first nor the last viral epidemicwhich societies around theworld are, were andwill be affected by.Which lessons
should be taken from the current pandemic situation? The Covid-19 disease is still not well characterised, and many research teams all
over the world are working on prediction of the epidemic scenario, protective measures to populations and sub-populations, therapeutic
and vaccination issues, amongst others. Contextually, countries with currently low numbers of Covid-19-infected individuals such as
Tunisia are intended to take lessons from those countries which already reached the exponential phase of the infection distribution as
well as from thosewhich have the exponential phase behind them and record aminor number of new cases such asChina. To this end, in
Tunisia, the pandemicwave has startedwith a significant delay comparedwith Europe, themain economic partner of the country. In this
paper, we do analyse the current pandemic situation in this country by studying the infection evolution and considering potential
protective strategies to prevent a pandemic scenario. Themodel is predictive based on a large number of undetected Covid-19 cases that
is particularly true for some country regions such as Sfax. Infection distribution and mortality rate analysis demonstrate a highly
heterogeneous picture over the country. Qualitative and quantitative comparative analysis leads to a conclusion that the reliable “real-
time”monitoring based on the randomised laboratory tests is the optimal predictive strategy to create the most effective evidence-based
preventive measures. In contrast, lack of tests may lead to incorrect political decisions causing either unnecessary over-protection of the
population that is risky for a long-term economic recession, or under-protection of the population leading to a post-containment
pandemic rebound. Recommendations are provided in the context of advanced predictive, preventive and personalised (3P) medical
approach.
Keywords Covid-19 . SARS-CoV-2 . Infection . Pandemic . Epidemics . Predictive preventive personalised (3P) medicine .
Bottle-neck . Strategy . Targeted protective measures . Multi-professional expertise . Laboratory medicine . Policymaking .
Salami-tactic . Population screening . “Real-time” monitoring . Home isolation . Comorbidities . Related mortality .
Depression . Suppressed immune defence . Suicide . Psychotic attitude . Violence . Anti-gene . Anti-body . Test . Individual
outcomes . Ethics . Titanic . Triage . Economy
Introduction
The current Coronavirus pandemic [1] is the most dramatic
healthcare crisis linked to acute and highly infectious disease
never faced by the global world since begin of the twentieth
century. The Coronavirus infectious disease has been first di-
agnosed in China. To restrict the epidemic spread was ex-
tremely challenging for China, since no prior information
was available about the new virus—the circumstance which
caused the “latent” observation period prior to decide on con-
tainment as a main and strict measure [2]. All other countries
involved are facing this pandemic threat with more or less
delay compared to each other: after China, the pandemic wave
appeared first in Asia followed by Europe deeply touching
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Abstract
Italy, France and Spain. The spread to America, Australia and
Africa then followed.
Since the pandemic spread in China, a series of studies
have been initiated in parallel for therapeutic [3, 4] and vacci-
nation [5] purposes. However, due to the current deficit in the
targeted treatment of Covid-19, protective measures present
the main strategy stream that most countries apply mainly at
the national and regional levels. The main goal of all the pro-
tective measures is to slow down the virus propagation in
order to adapt the number of severely sick people to the lim-
ited capacity of corresponding health system providing an
adequate care, and therefore to keep the morbidity level at a
minimum. However, to make preventive strategies working,
they should rely on the case-adapted multi-parametric predic-
tive models which are still missing for the Covid-19 pandem-
ic, due to many unclear parameters such as the real number of
infected persons in the country and specific characteristics of
individuals particularly predisposed to severe disease forms.
Consequently, protective recommendations are highly gener-
alised being limited to the social distancing [6] and hygiene
rules usual for any flu episode.
In addition to generalised protection, the diagnostic approach
is one of the main recommendations provided by the World
Health Organization (WHO). To this end, the most reliable
way to detect the infection is to perform the anti-gene-targeted
PCR analysis [7], in order to assess the presence of Covid-19
RNA (ribonucleic acid) in the hosting individual. However, this
approach demands the “real-time” monitoring, since the nega-
tively tested individual today, tomorrow may easily turn out as
positively tested. Therefore, more stable individual results and
population statistics would be provided by the anti-body tests to
detect everyone who diseased on Covid-19.
Because of low testing capacity especially at the very be-
ginning of the pandemic spread, most countries performed
tests generally to persons suffering from unclear and advanced
symptoms, or individuals who evidently have been in contact
with infected ones.
Countries facing the follow-up infection distribution being
luckily delayed in pandemic spread such as Tunisia, certainly
have to make a good use of currently accumulated knowledge.
The main objective of this paper is to support and to direct the
learning process. Specifically in Tunisia, per evidence the in-
fection has been imported primarily from Italy and France.
Since the very beginning of the pandemic spread in the coun-
try, Tunisian authorities intended to adopt a containment strat-
egy in order to limit the virus propagation, the main barrier for
which is a low testing capacity. Further, there is a significant
discrepancy in tests performance amongst the regions within
the country. How to proceed in this particular condition and
what are the main lessons from Covid-19 pandemic for the
moment?
The current article is not ambitioned to provide a complet-
ed analysis of the Covid-19 pandemic that will be possible
only when all the aspects will be clarified that currently is
definitely not the case. However, some fragmental informa-
tion available provides a good platform for preliminary anal-
ysis in the global context. Based on that, expert recommenda-
tions for comprehensive 3PM strategies are presented below.
Analytical focus
The analysis was performed to estimate Covid-19-related
mortality risks. This evaluation utilised regularly published
statistics, comparative studies performed in Italy and France
[8] and data reported by the Ministry of Health in Tunisia.
Comparative analysis of the infection evolution
Here the evolution of the infection propagation is pre-
sented as compared between France, Italy and Tunisia—
the countries which established containment instructions
with some delay against each other depending on the
local pandemic expansion. Figure 1 displays the evolu-
tion of infection in three countries of comparison for
9 days after the corresponding containment date.
Figure 1A displays the normalised (with respect to the total
number of inhabitants per country) curves of cumulative in-
fected cases for the same period of time, while Fig. 1B dis-
plays the new cases as percentage from the total numbers of
infected persons. To this end, for the data collection comprises
for both—France and Italy the period of time from February
15th to March 30th. For Tunisia, where the pandemic started
with some delay, the recorded period is from March 2nd to
29th.
From the images presented in Fig. 1, it is evident that the
pandemic evolution is rather similar for all three countries; in
particular, they are conjoint when the recorded numbers are
reaching their maximum. Similarly for all three counties, the
percentage of new cases starts to get stabilised after 5 contain-
ment days. Summarising, the countries of comparison have
applied similar containment rules and share similar evolution.
However, compared to France and Italy, Tunisia started the
containment almost 2 weeks earlier considering the level of
pandemic spread. This preventive measure allowed Tunisia so
far to reduce the absolute number of infected people.
Consequently, Tunisia currently counts less than 400 identi-
fied infection cases, while France and Italy count more than
45,000 and 101,000 cases, respectively. Table 1 presents the
identified infection numbers in all three countries, as well as
their respective containment dates.
From Table 1, it is evident that the percentage of infection
cases per thousand of inhabitants was significantly lower in
Tunisia compared to both - France and Italy.
To summarise, the pandemic evolution in Tunisia is similar
to this in Italy and France. However, the early containment
strategy allowed for reducing the absolute number of detected
cases as well as the relative number of cases recalculated
through the entire population.
To go beyond this conclusion, we have estimated the num-
ber of infected cases which Tunisia could deal with, if the
containment would be delayed by a week. Doing this, we have
used estimations based on the data recorded for France and
Italy assuming that one week before containment the evolu-
tion curve is a short-term linear one and follows the simple
equation
y ¼ axþ b ð1Þ
where x is the day and y stands for the cumulative infection
number. The parameters a and b have to be estimated using a
least squares (LS) estimation for example. Contextually, Fig. 2
illustrates the evolution of the infected cases for France and
Italycorresponding to the respective weeks before containment.
The figure also displays the estimated linear curves utilising the
LS method.
Although the evolutions of comparison are very similar to
each other, the evolution speed for France is slightly higher de-
spite the lower number of infections. Further, by assuming that
the evolution for Tunisiawould follow themean behaviour based
on the two estimated curves, if the containment would have been
delayed by only weeks, the corresponding number of infection
cases would be equal to 5.836 on March 29th, while on this day
the officially recorded number was 362. In the next section, the
analysis is presented to understand, whether this remarkable dif-
ference is due to early containment effect only.
The protective strategy in Tunisia: pros and cons
Here, we do analyse a currently applied protective strategy in
Tunisia resulting in relatively low numbers of officially recorded
Covid-19 infection cases. To be noted, the laboratory testing ca-
pacity (PCR) in Tunisia is highly limited compared with France
and Italy. Indeed, the maximum recorded tests made in Tunisia
are 724 daily, while only the city of Marseille in France provides
than 11,000 tests per day. To this end, currently Tunisia is inten-
sively working on increasing the testing capacity significantly,
specifically focusing on PCR anti-gene tests. Further, Tunisia
follows the same targeted test strategy as practised in France
and Italy: the tests are done principally for individuals who evi-
dently were in contact with Covid-19-infected persons or
patients presenting severe symptoms of manifested disease.
Taking these facts into account, it is getting clear that the real
numbers of infected cases should be much higher than the offi-
cially recorded ones. This conclusion is well supported by the
study performed by the University of Göttingen in Germany,
which demonstrates that on average only 6% of actual SARS-
CoV-2 infections are detected worldwide, and the real number of
infections may have reached several tens of millions in April
Table 1 Pandemic reflection in
France, Italy and Tunisia; the
early containment strategy
allowed for reducing the absolute
number of detected cases in
Tunisia
France Italy Tunisia
Containment date March 17th March 9th March 22nd
Absolute number of cases recorded before the containment 7730 9172 89
Absolute number of cases recorded till March 30th 44,550 101,739 394
Population in millions 67 60 11
% infection cases per thousand of inhabitants 0.66 1.69 0.035
Fig. 1 Evolution A of infection numbers and B of percentage of new cases
(B): PERCENTAGE OF NEW CASES(A) CUMULATIVE INFECTION NUMBER
2020 [9]. Furthermore, the tests performed in Tunisia till now do
not provide representative statistics for the whole country, since
the density for both—the population and tests performance—
differ significantly from region to region in the country.
Contextually, alarmingly high death rates in some regions such
as Sfax have been recorded. To this end, Sfax is the city with the
second highest population density hosting almost 9%of the entire
population in the country. In this city, fourteen Covid-19 cases
were officially registered on March 29th with 3 lethal outcomes
that means 21% mortality. In contrast, in Sousse the mortality
rates of 4% are recorded. At the same time, the so-called big
Tunis region (about 25% of the entire population) has recorded
one lethal outcome (0.66%) within 150 officially recorded cases.
Specifically in this region, the anti-gene PCR tests are most ef-
fectively performed utilising the lab medical capacity of two
specialised centres from altogether four currently existing in
Tunisia (status quo on March 30th, 2020) which conforms with
the recommendation of WHO [10] to broadly apply testing strat-
egy that helps to decrease the overall mortality. Indeed, patients
identified at early stages of the disease could benefit from
adapted treatments. In contrast, for the moment the Sfax region
does not host any specialised medical centre with a consequence
of extremely low testing activity in the region. The majority of
infected individuals have not been tested. As amatter of fact, two
of three deaths correspond to persons who have not been provid-
ed a medical care; they died at home and postmortem have been
positively tested for the Coronavirus infection as the cause of
their death.
Conclusions
Per evidence, deficits in the testing procedure led to increased
mortality due to undetected infection cases. In the context of
Tunisia, the main problem is the testing inequality amongst the
regions: the testing is focused on the capital but is not adequately
performed through over all the regions. Further, highly limited
testing capacity in the country causes a huge discrepancy between
the officially recorded and real infection cases. Indeed, if accord-
ing to the already known statistics, the mortality rates of the Sfax
region get extrapolated for the entire country, the current real
number of infected individuals would be as high as 5000 cases
for Tunisia now. This estimation is indeed close to the numbers
resulted from the above presentedmodel (see the above presented
“Comparative analysis of the infection evolution”). The official
statistics revealed only 10% of tested people were Covid-19 pos-
itive. Taking this number in consideration, more than 45,000 tests
have to be performed in order to limit the virus propagation
before stopping containment. However, the tests have been per-
formed only for persons with severe disease symptoms and after
evident contact to infected patients. Therefore, assuming that the
real number of infected persons is four to ten times higher, at least
150,000 tests have to be performed prior to decide on stopping
containment. Further, the “real-time” anti-gene monitoring is es-
sential, since persons negatively tested today can be positively
tested tomorrow. To this end, anti-body tests would provide more
stable data on how many persons have been diseased. Finally, a
relatively cheap but reliable X-ray diagnostic approach can also
be considered utilising novel artificial intelligence tools [11].
Lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic: a global
approach in the context of 3P medicine
Covid-19 is neither the first nor the last viral epidemic which
societies around the world are, were and will be affected by.
Which lessons should be taken from the current pandemic
situation?
& More prediction is essential to avoid mistakes in the deci-
sion making process.
& Retrospective analysis of data is needed to create a valid
scenario of current and coming epidemics. Thereby,
evidence-based monitoring, providing reliable data and
international data exchange, is crucial.
& Creation of prototype algorithms as the basic predictive tool
to be prepared for the next epidemics is highly desirable.
& Laboratory medicine is central in combating pandemics. An
excellent example has been provided by Iceland with
randomised tests to the population in order to estimate the
real number of infected persons. To this end, the “real-time”
monitoring is essential utilising both the anti-gene and anti-
body tests.
& Multi-professional expertise is an obligation to create effec-
tive strategies including laboratory medicine, epidemiology,
virology, immunology, microbiology, pulmonology,
Fig. 2 Evolution of the infection numbers a week before containment
(solid lines) and their linear approximation over the period (dashed lines)
psychology, psychiatry, disease-modelling and bioinformat-
ics, amongst others.
& Resolute targeted prevention instead of “salami” tactic
should be considered by policymakers. Delayed and un-
consolidated region-dependent measures as well as highly
heterogeneous attitude ranging from “doing nothing”,
“observing what other are doing” up to within few days
changing mind from “no matter” to “facing a severe prob-
lem” is misleading for populations which under the epi-
demic condition need particularly clear statements and
well justified strategies.
& Personalisation of protective measures and treatments are
essential by evidence-based identifying groups at risk and
stratifying patients based on the individualised profiling.
& Ethical aspects: under pandemic conditions, the triage pre-
sents a “Titanic”-unlike dilemma, namely which groups of
individuals should be prioritised for which kind ofmedical
services. In case of Titanic, the decision was relatively
simple: children and women have been prioritised for
placing into the limited number of boats. More complicat-
ed is the “triage” for infected individuals under epidemic
conditions, due to highly complex situations. Under the
optimal scenario, a “bottle-neck” should be minimised
and targeted protection should be provided to any group
in the population. Under the current Covid-19 pandemic,
these include timely epidemiologic data collection, suffi-
cient laboratory tests, well in time organised isolation of
elderly, protective measures to employees at points with
high density of contacts (shops, schools, transport, etc.),
financial support to low-income groups and economically
weak enterprises. From the ethical point of view, again,
predictive algorithms are needed to create the most effec-
tive targeted preventive measures and personalised care to
citizens by implementing 3PM concepts.
& Relevance of economic aspects for individual health out-
comes: The current pandemic caused unemployment and
economic depression at individual and population levels fre-
quently leading to a cascade of comorbidities including de-
pression, suppressed immune defence, suicide, psychotic at-
titude and violence, amongst others, resulting in related mor-
tality. Therefore, a well-justified balance between ordered
limitations to the population (home isolation, temporary un-
employment etc.) aiming at decreasing the number of
new Covid-19 infected cases on the one hand and well-
controlled timely normalisation of the societal functioning
on the other hand is essential based on reliable predictive
algorithms.
The above provided recommendations are conform with the
3PM-related guidelines published by the European Association
for Predictive, Preventive and Personalised Medicine [12].
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